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INTRODUCTION
Federal Circuit patent law watching was never more important or
more challenging than it was in 1991 and promises to be in 1992.
The soaring economic significance of patents forces more interest
groups to monitor the court's work product. Recent changes in
court membership complicate the task. New judges do not always
cause major doctrinal changes in mature legal environments such as
the patent system. Their fresh styles of opinion writing and legal
analysis and diverse backgrounds may, however, give settled rules
new twists. They may also subtly shift the court's focus to less trod-
den areas where "a new kid on the block" can have more influence, 
The following review summarizes selected published opinions on
substantive patent law by the Federal Circuit in 1991.2
1. An example is the treatment of personal property interests in patents and the impli-
cations on standing to sue and recover infringement damages. In 1991, a number of plaintiffs
sought to modify the rule that one must have legal title to a patent during the time of infringe-
ment to sue for damages, but the court was reluctant to loosen the standard. See FilmTec
Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1573-74, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1508, 1511 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (holding that plaintiff with questionable legal title to patent cannot obtain preliminary
injunction); Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1580-82, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1513,
1518-19 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that agreement to assign does not vest legal title in plain-
tiff); cf. Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.p.A., 944 F.2d 870, 873-76, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d 1045, 1049-52 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that patentee's grant of all substantial
rights to plaintiff allows plaintiff alone to sue for infringement).
2. Space limitations dictate that some important areas be omitted, including:
(1) the laches and estoppel defenses, e.g., Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro
Italia S.p.A., 944 F.2d 870, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1045 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
(2) assignor estoppel, e.g., Intel Corp. v. International Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821 (Fed.
Cir. 1991); Acoustical Design, Inc. v. Control Elec. Co., 932 F.2d 939, 18 U.S.P.Q2d 1707
(Fed. Cir. 1991);
(3) consent decrees' res judicata effect, e.g., Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
(4) preliminary injunction standards, e.g., Conair Group, Inc. v. Automatik Apparate-Mas-
chinenbau GmbH, 944 F.2d 862, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1067 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Lund Indus., Inc. v.
GO Indus., Inc., 938 F.2d 1273, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1991); We Care, Inc. v. Ultra
Mark, Int'I Corp., 930 F.2d 1567, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Nutrition 21 v, United
States, 930 F.2d 867, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Oakley, Inc. v. International
Tropic-Cal, Inc., 923 F.2d 167, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
(5) damages, e.g., Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d 1540, 19 U.S.P.Q2d
1432 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d 1842 (Fed. Cir. 1991); SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 926
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I. PATENTABILITY ISSUES
A. The "On Sale" and "Public Use" Bars
The Patent Act bars a patent if an invention was "on sale" or "in
public use" in the United States for more than one year before the
inventor filed an application.3 The hallmarks of "on sale" and
"public use" law are fact specificity and policy domination. The
court's decisions emphasize that application of the bars depends on
the "totality of the circumstances" 4 and that their policies "in effect,
define [them]." 5 The policies behind the bars include discouraging
removal of inventions from the public domain that the public rea-
sonably believes are freely available; encouraging speedy and wide-
spread disclosure of inventions; allowing an inventor time to
determine the patent's economic value; and preventing an inventor
from the commercial exploitation of his invention beyond the time
set by the statute.6
Two 1991 "on sale" bar decisions focused on burdens of proof
and inference drawing in cases in which the evidence indicating ex-
actly what was offered when was thin. These cases reach results in-
consistent in tone, if not in holding. Sonoscan, Inc. v. Sonotek, Inc.7
approved a district court's reliance on post-critical date evidence to
infer, first, that pre-critical date price quotations were in fact for the
patented invention and, second, that the inventors had sufficiently
developed the invention before the critical date." Intel Corp. v. Inter-
national Trade Commission,9 on the other hand, disparaged "exten-
sive" inference drawing in applying the "on sale" bar.10 The patent
in Intel related to EPROM memory chips. Intel, the inventors' as-
signee, distributed fifty sample chips embodying the invention to
F.2d 1161, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1922 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d
1136, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828 (Fed. Cir. 1991); and
(6) willful infringement, advice of counsel, and multiple damages, e.g., Quantum Corp. v.
Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d
1540, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Acoustical Design, Inc. v. Control Elec. Co., 932
F.2d 939, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1707 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Litho-
graphing Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
4. U.S. Envtl. Prods., Inc. v. Westall, 911 F.2d 713, 716, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1898, 1901
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
5. RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1062, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1449, 1454
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
6. Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g, Inc., 904 F.2d 1571, 1574, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1230,
1233 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
7. 936 F.2d 1261, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
8. Sonoscan, Inc. v. Sonotek, Inc., 936 F.2d 1261, 1263, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1156, 1159
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
9. 946 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
10. Intel Corp. v. International Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 830 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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fifty Intel salesmen at a May 1984 sales conference." IIt placed no
restrictions on the chips' disposal, and salesmen "were expected to
pass the samples on to their customers."' 2 Intel filed a patent appli-
cation claiming the invention on June 7, 1985, makingJune 7, 1984
the critical date. In upholding the patent against an "on sale" bar
challenge, the trier of fact found that (1) the samples were pre-pro-
duction engineering samples that were not available for sale; (2) In-
tel's intent was "clearly commercial" and, if the salesmen
distributed the samples before the critical date, there would be an
"on sale" bar; but (3) the respondents failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that any customer received the chip prior to
June 7.13 The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that a finding of
actual sale or offer before the critical date would require the fact-
finder to draw "extensive inferences," which would be inconsistent
with the standard of clear and convincing evidence. 14
B. Novelty and Anticipation
An invention defined in one or more patent claims must be new.
The test for novelty-or its absence, called "anticipation"-is the
same as that for literal infringement. A claim flunks the novelty re-
quirement if it covers a single prior art reference disclosure. Antici-
pation occurs only when a person of ordinary skill in the field of the
invention would find no difference between the claimed invention
and the reference disclosure. 15
What a prior art reference teaches may present a complex fact
question. In Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.,1'6
an issue centered on whether Robert Harris' earlier thesis antici-
pated the later patented invention-high purity and activity human
Factor VIII:C preparations.17 The parties filed three successive dec-
larations by Dr. Harris, each explaining his dissertation. The Fed-
eral Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment
invalidating the claims for anticipation, holding that the district
court improperly resolved the summary judgment motion because
apparent inconsistencies existed among the three Harris declara-
11. Id. at 829.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 830.
15. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1010, petition for reh g denied and petition for reh 'g in banc under consideration, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d 1896 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
16. 927 F.2d 1565, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d I001, petition for reh g denied and petition for reh g in banc
under consideration, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1896 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
17. Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1570, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1004-05.
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tions that raised questions as to the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence interpreting scientific data.' 8 The court
agreed that extrinsic evidence may be considered to explain the dis-
closure of a reference, but cautioned that such evidence is of limited
probative value because a finding of anticipation is impossible un-
less all aspects of the claimed invention were already described in a
single reference.' 9 Such a finding cannot be made ifit is necessary
to prove facts beyond those disclosed in the reference. The court
thus concluded that extrinsic evidence should be used only to show
the decisionmaker the meaning of the reference to persons of ordi-
nary skill in the field, and not to close gaps in the reference. 20 Go-
ing outside a single reference to provide missing disclosure of the
claimed invention should therefore occur, not in cases involving sec-
tion 102 anticipation, but rather in those involving section 103
obviousness. 2'
C. Obviousness
In past years, the Federal Circuit has labored to rationalize the
section 103 nonobviousness requirement. 22 Although section 103
was not a central focus in 1991, a number of cases illustrated the
continuing difficulties in applying it to high (and not so high) tech-
nology inventions.
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.,23 involved an isolated DNA
sequence encoding human erythropoietin (EPO) and host cells
transformed with the sequence. The court held that the plaintiff's
patent claims to this sequence were not obvious because no reason-
able expectation of success existed on the invention date in cloning
18. Id. at 1578, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1011.
19. Id. at 1576, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1010.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1577, 18 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 10 10. But see In re Baxter Travenol Lab., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d
1281, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that patent claims regarding system for processing and
storing whole blood were barred by anticipation because document describing new system
existed).
22. See In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692-93, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1897, 1900-02 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(holding that proved structural similarity between subject matter of claimed and prior art,
where prior art gives reason to make the claimed composition, creates prima fade case of
obviousness), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1682 (1991); Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize
Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 907-08, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1788, 1792-93 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding that
showing that every element of patent was demonstrated in prior art does not invalidate patent
when combination of elements does not suggest the invention to person of ordinary skill in
field); DMI, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 802 F.2d 421,423, 231 U.S.P.Q. 276, 278-79 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(holding that finding of obviousness depends on scope of prior art, differences between in-
vention and prior art, and unexpected results); Peterson Mfg. Co. v. Central Purchasing, Inc.,
740 F.2d 1541, 1548, 222 U.S.P.Q. 562, 567 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that obviousness claim
requires consideration of distinguishing features of disputed design).
23. 927 F.2d 1200, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1016 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
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the EPO gene using either the inventor's unique strategy or the in-
fringer's alternative suggested strategy. 24
In In re Gorman,25 the Federal Circuit upheld the PTO's rejection
of an applicant's claim to a "composite candy sucker on a stick,
molded in an elastomeric mold in the shape of a human thumb."26
The court upheld this finding of obviousness even though the claim
was extremely specific and detailed and the PTO relied on thirteen
prior art references. 27
Similarly, in In re Young 28 the court upheld the PTO's rejection of
an applicant's claim to an underwater acoustic pulse generating
method for offshore seismic exploration as obvious in view of one
prior art reference, even though a later reference purported to dis-
credit the first.29 The court stated that when prior art contains ap-
parently conflicting references, the PTO "must weigh each
reference for its power to suggest solutions to an artisan of ordinary
skill." 30
Injurgens v. McKasy,3 ' the court upheld ajury verdict that a patent
claiming a windsock goose hunting decoy was not invalid for obvi-
ousness. The jury made presumed findings in the patentee's favor
on the prior art's teachings and on the status of a disputed refer-
ence, a dragon's head windsock, as analogous art.3 2 Because the
infringer failed to make a timely directed verdict motion, he could
not challenge the sufficiency of evidence underlying the jury's pre-
sumed findings.33
How amenable to summary judgment is the obviousness un-
patentability defense? On the one hand, the defense often requires
resolution of many fact issues, including "primary" technical facts
24. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1207-09, 18 U.S.P.0,2d
1016, 1020-23 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991); see In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 493
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (reversing PTO rejection of claims to a "chimeric" gene, uniting Bacillus
genus bacterium gene, whose product is insecticidal protein, and DNA promoter in host cya-
nobacterium and stating that obviousness under section 103 requires consideration of
(1) whether prior art would suggest to one ordinarily skilled in the art to make claimed com-
position or device, or carry out claimed process; and (2) whether prior art would also have
revealed reasonable expectation of success in so doing); Intel Corp. v. International Trade
Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 835 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding claimed invention, extending EPROM
chip's side walls to shield it from ultraviolet radiation, not to be obvious because it increased
life of cell and gave it previously unknown practical uses).
25. 933 F.2d 982, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1885 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
26. In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 983, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1885, 1886 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
27. Id. at 986-87, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1886-88.
28. 927 F.2d 588, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
29. In re Young, 927 F.2d 588, 591-92, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1089, 1091-92 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
30. Id. at 591, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1091.
31. 927 F.2d 1552, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
32. Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1557-60, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1031, 1036-38 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 U.S. 281 (1991).
33. Id. at 1560, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1038.
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such as the prior art's teachings and "secondary" inferential facts
such as commercial success. 34 Yet, invalidity in view of teachings of
specific prior art is sometimes so clear that there can be no genuine
fact issues preventing summary disposition.3 5
D. Prior Art
"Prior art" is central to determinations of patentability. Both the
novelty and nonobviousness requirements involve comparing the
patent claim with individual and collective teachings of the prior art.
Unlike some other major patent systems which sweep all publicly
available information released before the patent application filing
date into the prior art,3 6 United States patent law defines "prior art"
in a complex manner, making distinctions based on place, person,
and format as well as time.3 7 For example, a pre-invention date,
third-party public use is prior art if the use is in the United States
but not if the use is in another country. 38
In re Bartfeld39 illustrates prior art's complexity. In Bartfeld, the
court confirmed that a common owner of two patents or patent ap-
plications cannot use a terminal disclaimer to overcome a "[s]ection
102(e)/103 rejection." 40  One inventor's patent disclosures are
prior art in assessing the patentability of a different inventor's sub-
sequent claims even though both inventors assigned their rights to
the same organization. 41 The section 103 common ownership prior
art disqualifier, added by a 1984 amendment, applies to information
derived under section 102(f) and to another's prior invention under
section 102(g), but not to disclosure in a senior filed, different in-
34. See Continental Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1265-66, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d 1746, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that erroneous granting of summary judg-
ment prolongs litigation and increases its burdens, which is "of particular concern in patent
disputes, where the patent property is a wasting asset, and justice is ill served by delay in final
resolution.").
35. See Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 715, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1053, 1055
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding that all elements of combination invention were so well known that
obviousness could not be questioned).
36. See Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, Resolution Con-
cerning Prior Use or Possession, reprinted in 15 Irr'L LEGAL MATERIALS 39 (1976) (stating that
prior art includes all information publicly available at time patent application is filed).
37. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). Section 102 governs the issuance of patents for an inven-
tion which is not novel. Id. A finding of lack of novelty depends on a number of factors. For
example, a patent cannot be issued for an invention "known" in the United States, but it can
for an invention "known" in a foreign country, unless it was patented or described in a pat-
ented publication. Id. § 102(a).
38. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) (stating that person is entitled to patent unless inven-
tion was in public use or on sale "in this country" for more than one year prior to date of
application for U.S. patent).
39. 925 F.2d 1450, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1885 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
40. In re Bartfeld, 925 F.2d 1450, 1451, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1885, 1886 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
41. Id. at 1452 & n.7, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1887 & n.7.
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ventor patent under section 102(e).42 The court therefore found
that the statute's clear exclusion of section 102(e) prior art from its
coverage left it no room to respond to the appellant's Argument that
"corporate assignees are routinely forced to use burdensome and
costly procedures such as abandoning both applications and refiling
a combined application." 43 Terminal disclaimers are effective to
overcome double patenting problems, but not section 102(e)/103
rejections. 44 The two differ in that "[d]ouble patenting depends en-
tirely on what is claimed in an issued patent ... [while] [o]bviousness
relates to what is disclosed (whether or not claimed) in a prior art
reference (whether or not a patent)."'45 Because terminal disclaimers
seek to limit the term of a patent rather than to remove a reference
as prior art, they are not appropriate to overcome section 102(e)/
103 rejections.46
E. First Inventor
The United States patent system applies a first-to-invent rule to
determine priority among conflicting claimants to the same inven-
tion. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) resolves invention
priority questions in interference proceedings. 47 Priority questions
42. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). This section provides:
Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art only under
subsection (f) or (g) of section 102 of this title, shall not preclude patentability under
this section where the subject matter and the claimed invention were, at the time the
invention was made, owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assign-
ment to the same person.
Id.
43. Bartfeld, 925 F.2d at 1452-53, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1887-88.
44. Id at 1453, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1888.
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 674, 18 U.S.P.O,2d
1302, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that interference proceedings are declared to determine
priority among multiple patent applicants or applicant and patentee, and that such proceed-
ings may consider issues of patentability but not infringement).
Minnesota Mining illustrates the complex relationships that may arise between PTO interfer-
ence proceedings and judicial proceedings involving questions of patent infringement and
validity. In the case, Norton filed a patent application covering a seeded gel process for mak-
ing abrasive grain using aluminum seeds. Id. at 671, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1303. Later, Minnesota
Mining & Manufacturing (3M) filed an application claiming a similar process using both alu-
minum and iron seeds. Id, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1303-04. Norton obtained a patent claiming the
aluminum seed process. Id. 3M filed a declaration of interference between its application and
Norton's patent over priority of invention of the aluminum seed process. Id. Norton asserted
that 3M's iron seed product infringed its patent under the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 672,
18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1304.
When Norton sent 3M's customers cease-and-desist letters, 3M filed suit for a declaratory
judgment of noninfringement. Id. The district court exercised its discretion to dismiss the
suit because the interference could have left the infringement issue moot by awarding 3M
invention priority. Id. The Federal Circuit held that this was an abuse of discretion because
the interference would not necessarily resolve the infringement question and because the de-
lay would cause 3M irreparable injury. Id. at 676, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1306.
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may also arise in other contexts because prior invention may estab-
lish prior art for novelty and nonobviousness purposes.48
The first inventor is the person who first reduces the invention to
practice, either actually or constructively, unless a rival shows prior
conception and, from a time just before the other conception or re-
duction to practice, worked diligently to reduce it to practice. 49
Conception and reduction to practice are central to the determina-
tion of invention priority, and each was the subject of a 1991 Fed-
eral Circuit decision.
Focusing on conception in unpredictable technologies such as
biotechnology, Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co0.5 applied the
doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice.
Amgen's patent claimed an isolated DNA sequence encoding human
erythropoietin (EPO) and host cells transformed with the se-
quence.51 Amgen's scientist, Dr. Fu-Kuen Lin, first reduced the in-
vention to practice by cloning the EPO gene. Defendant Genetic
Institute contended that its scientist, Dr. Fritsch, was the first to con-
ceive the strategy eventually successful in cloning the EPO gene-
screening a human genomic DNA library with two sets of fully de-
generate cDNA probes from different EPO gene regions. The court
found that whether there was an adequate conception of the inven-
tion depended entirely on reduction to practice because of the un-
certainties of the method and lack of information about the
sequence.52
The Federal Circuit explained that conception has two elements:
(1) the idea of the invention's structure; and (2) the possession of a
workable method for making it. 53 Sometimes, an inventor cannot
establish a conception until the invention is reduced to practice
through a successful experiment, which results in simultaneous con-
ception and reduction to practice. 54 The court stressed that the
EPO DNA sequence was unknown until plaintiff cloned it, and that
because the inventor was unable to envision its detailed constitution
or the method of obtaining it, conception was not achieved until the
sequence was reduced to practice, the moment at which the gene
48. See New Idea Farm Equip. Corp. v. Sperry Corp., 916 F.2d 1561, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1424
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (invalidating patents as anticipated because another individual conceived and
implemented invention).
49. Id. at 1566-67, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1429-30.
50. 927 F.2d 1200, 1205-07, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1016, 1021 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
169 (1991).
51. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugi Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1203-04, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d
1016, 1019-21 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
52. Id. at 1207, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1022.
53. Id. at 1206, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1020-21.
54. Id.
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was isolated. 55 The court therefore concluded that neither Fritsch
nor Lin invented EPO or the EPO gene because the claimed inven-
tion was the new, pure, isolated sequence and neither inventor knew
its structure or physical characteristics or had a viable method to
obtain it until it was actually obtained and characterized. 56
Further, the court found lacking the defendant's argument that it
had priority because the trial court found that Fritsch's two-probe
strategy distinguished the invention over the prior art.57 The court
stated that Fritsch's alleged conception was "mere speculation" be-
cause it was not specific enough to allow an individual skilled in the
relevant field to clone the EPO gene successfully. 58 Moreover, ex-
perts who testified for both sides indicated that success in cloning
the gene was not ensured until the gene was in fact isolated and
until its sequence was known. 59
DSL Dynamic Sciences Ltd. v. Union Switch & Signal, Inc. 60 applied the
testing requirement of actual reduction to practice. The case in-
volved invention of a mount assembly for a railway car coupler.61
The senior applicant-patentee, DSL, filed its application on Septem-
ber 9, 1983, which was the effective invention date because the in-
vention's conception and reduction to practice occurred in Canada
and section 104 precludes proof of invention dates by activity
outside of the United States.62 The junior applicant, Union Switch,
filed its application on March 27, 1984.63 To show a reduction to
practice prior to the patentee's filing date, Union Switch relied on a
prototype built around April 1, 1983 and tested on moving trains
during May 1983. 64
The senior party attacked the adequacy of the test on two
grounds. First, Union Switch tested the prototype on a caboose
rather than on its intended environment, a freight car. The senior
party argued that freight cars have an inferior suspension system
55. Id The court stated that "Fritsch had a goal of obtaining the isolated EPO gene,
whatever its identity, and even had a possible method of obtaining it, [but] . . . he did not
conceive a purified and isolated DNA sequence encoding EPO and a viable method for ob-
tamining it until after Lin." Id
56. Id
57. Id
58. Id. at 1206-07, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1021.
59. Id. at 1207, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1021.
60. 928 F.2d 1122, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
61. DSL Dynamic Sciences Ltd. v. Union Switch & Signal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1122, 1123, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d 1152, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
62. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 104 (1988) ("[an applicant for a patent ... may not establish a
date of invention by reference to knowledge or use thereof, or other activity with respect
thereto, in a foreign country .... ).
63. DSL, 928 F.2d at 1123, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1153.
64. Id. at 1123-24, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1153.
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that might have caused the prototype to fail. The court, however,
found the tests sufficient because Union Switch performed them
under conditions sufficiently similar to those of the intended envi-
ronment.65 Second, the senior party pointed out that commercial
assemblies built according to the prototype design later failed and
required major modifications before they were suitable for use. The
court found that this did not prove that the prototype test was inad-
equate because "there is ... no requirement that an invention, when
tested, be in a commercially satisfactory stage of development in or-
der to reduce the invention to practice." 66
F. Double Patenting
Double patenting is a judicially developed doctrine that prohibits
an inventor or a common assignee of several inventors from ob-
taining more than one patent claiming substantially the same inven-
tion.67 It prevents improper patent term extension and protects
potential accused infringers from multiple suits. A terminal dis-
claimer in a second or subsequent patent eliminates a double pat-
enting objection unless the two patents claim exactly the same
invention.68
1. The 'first-in, " "second-out" problem
The usual double patenting test-whether the claimed subject
matter in the second patent or application would have been un-
patentably obvious in view of the claimed subject matter of the
first-does not apply comfortably to situations in which the first pat-
ent is an improvement to or variation on the invention disclosed and
claimed in an application filed first but examined or issued second.
In In re Braat,69 the court held that the PTO erred in rejecting an
applicant's claims on obviousness-type double patenting grounds. 70
A "two-way" rather than "one-way" patentability test applies when
an inventor or assignee files a patent application claiming an im-
provement or combination invention after a patent application
65. Id. at 1125, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1154.
66. Id at 1126, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1155.
67. See In re Braat, 937 F.2d 589, 592, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1289, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(defining double patenting as judicially created doctrine that prevents improper timewise ex-
tension of patent right by prohibiting issuance of claims in second patent indistinguishable
from claims in first).
68. See 35 U.S.C. § 253 (1988) (allowing patentee to disclaim "any terminal part of the
term... of the patent," thus guaranteeing that both patents expire at same time); see also In re
Lang, 759 F.2d 887, 892-95, 225 U.S.P.Q. 645, 648-50 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (discussing terminal
disclaimers).
69. 937 F.2d 589, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
70. In re Braat, 937 F.2d 589, 589, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1289, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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claiming the basic or subcombination invention has been filed but
the second-filed application issues first through no fault of the in-
ventor or assignee.7' In Braat, Dil's patent and Braat's application,
both assigned to Philips, related to optical record carriers, such as
compact discs (CDs), that store information to be retrieved by a ra-
diation beam, such as a laser. Braat's U.S. application claimed an
April 3, 1978 Netherlands application priority date. Dil's patent is-
sued June 24, 1980 on an application filed January 31, 1979.72
Circular optical record carriers store information in tracks consist-
ing of information areas, or "pits," separated by intermediate re-
gions, or "lands." Information is encoded by varying the length or
spacing between the pits, and the information is retrieved by pro-
jecting a read beam onto the information tracks, which detects varia-
tions in the light transmitted through or reflected from the tracks. 7"
Because the ability of the read apparatus to focus the beam on a
single track limits track density, one way to increase carrier informa-
tion density is to place tracks closer together. If the tracks are too
close, however, the beam may inadvertently illuminate an adjacent
track, resulting in interference or "crosstalk." '74
Braat's application disclosed a way to reduce "crosstalk" by alter-
nating adjacent track phase depth and using two detection systems,
one sensitive to first phase depth tracks and the other sensitive to
second phase depth tracks. Dil's patent disclosed a way of control-
ling information record carrier phase depth by precisely angling
phase depth.75 Dil recognized that his invention was particularly
useful in combination with Braat's. Dil's patent independent claim 1
was to the angle side wall improvement; its dependent claims 5/1 and
6/1 recited Braat's alternating phase depth structure as an addi-
tional feature. 76
The PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board) af-
firmed the examiner's rejection of Bratt's claims for obviousness-
type double patenting. The Board reasoned that (1) because
Braat's claims were broader than Dil's claims 5/1 and 6/1, the
double patenting rejection properly prevented an unjustified exten-
sion in time of the right to exclude; and (2) that the issue was not
whether the claims in Dil were patentably distinct from the claims in
71. Id. at 593, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1292.
72. Id. at 590, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1290.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 591, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1291.
76. Id. at 592, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1291.
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Braat's application but whether the claims on appeal were patent-
ably distinct over claims 5/1 and 6/1 of Dil.77
On appeal, the assignee characterized Dil's invention as an im-
provement over Braat's invention and advanced the proposition that
when a patent issues on a later-filed improvement before the issu-
ance of a patent on an earlier-filed basic invention, rejection of the
claims to the basic invention for double patenting is only proper if
the improvement is not patentably distinct from the basic inven-
tion. 78 The court viewed the two inventions as combination and
subcombination, rather than improvement invention and basic in-
vention,79 but agreed with the assignee's proposition. The court
pointed out that an applicant who files applications for basic and
improvement patents has no control over the rate at which applica-
tions are processed in the PTO and should not be penalized for it.
Therefore, the order of issuance, out of fairness, should be ignored,
making the relevant determination whether the improvement is
"patentably distinct from the generic invention." 80 Thus, in this
case, the court concluded that it would not have been possible for
the assignee to include either the claims of Dil in the Braat applica-
tion (for Braat did not invent the subject matter of the Dil claims) or
the claims of Braat in the Dil application (for Dil did not invent the
subject matter of the Braat application).81 The assignee filed the
Braat and Dil applications in order to maintain proper inventorship,
with the first application containing claims directed to Braat's "sub-
combination" invention and the second containing claims directed
to both Dil's "subcombination" invention and to the "combination"
invention. The assignee could not control the fact that the PTO
issued the Dil patent first.82
77. Id.
78. Id. at 593, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1292 (citing 3 DoNA.D S. CHisuM, PATENTS § 9.03[21[c],
at 9-33 (1991) and In re Borah, 354 F.2d 1009, 1017, 148 U.S.P.Q. 213, 219-20 (C.C.P.A.
1966)).
79. Braat, 937 F.2d at 593, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1292. The court stated that:
The word "improvement" implies that it was developed specifically for use with the
"basic" invention, and thus must have come later in time.... The Dil patent inven-
tion... is totally separate from that of Braat, and could conceivably have been devel-
oped earlier rather than later. The inventions of Dil and Braat are independent but
when jointly used may complement each other, and it is for that reason that Dil dis-
closed the Braat invention in his own patent application and, in claims 5/1 and 6/1,
claimed the use of the two inventions in combination.... Braat and Dil each devel-
oped separate subcombination inventions, which are described by their respective
independent claims. Dil then combined these two subcombinations to form a third
invention. This combination is described by [Dil's] dependent claims ....
Id. (emphasis in original).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 593-94, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1293-94.
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Applying the "two-way" test, the court reversed the double pat-
enting rejection because Dii's patent claims 5/1 and 6/1 were pat-
entably distinct from Braat's application claims, even though Braat's
claims were not patentably distinct from Dil's claims.83 The court
admitted that allowing Braat's application would result in an exten-
sion of the time of the assignee's patent protection of the Dil struc-
ture because Braat's claims dominated the invention of Dil's
claims.8 4 It noted, however, that double patenting rejection is only
appropriate when such an extension of a patent right is unjustified,
and found the extension in this case to be justified.85
2. Section 121 's protective shield
After an inventor files a patent application, the PTO may, and
often does, impose a "restriction" identifying two or more separate
and independent inventions and requiring the applicant to elect
which invention to pursue. Patent Act section 121, together with
section 120, allows the applicant to pursue the non-elected inven-
tions in a divisional application, retaining the benefit of the original
application's filing date. The third sentence of section 121 prohibits
a patent that issues either (1) "on an application with respect to
which a requirement for restriction under this section has been
made"; or (2) "on an application filed as a result of such a require-
ment" from being used "as a reference" against either "a divisional
application" (or any patent issuing thereon) or "the original appli-
cation" (or any patent issuing thereon).86
Case law interpreting this portion of section 121 is amazingly
sparse. In the 1990 decision, Gerber Garment Technology, Inc. v. Lectra
Systems, Inc.,87 the Federal Circuit held that section 121 does not ab-
solutely protect a patent issuing on a divisional or continuing appli-
cation filed as a result of an examiner restriction requirement from
double patenting invalidity.88 The court concluded that this section
applies only when a second patent's claims are consonant with the
83. Id. Braat's rejected claims did not refer to any side wall angling, much less to Di's
specific angles. In Braat's preferred embodiment, the information areas are all rectangular
and have side walls that are not inclined "relative to the normal to the record carrier." Id. at
594, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1293-94.
84. Id. at 593, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1293. The court's finding of "some" time extension,
however, is an understatement. Because the Dil patent issued in 1980, the Braat patent would
provide an 11-year extension (assuming a 1991 issue date).
85. Id. at 594, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1293.
86. See 35 U.S.C. § 121 (1988) (discussing divisional applications in reference to section
120).
87. 916 F.2d 683, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
88. Gerber Garment Technology, Inc. v. Lectra Sys., Inc., 916 F.2d 683, 688, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d 1436, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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claims not elected by the inventor in response to the restriction re-
quirement.8 9 The Gerber Garment consonance standard needs refine-
ment, particularly with respect to the specification of the kinds of
claim amendments and additions in the second application that will
bring the claims outside the prohibition of section 121. Symbol Tech-
nologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc.,90 which held that divisional application
apparatus claims may be consonant with a PTO examiner's restric-
tion requirement referring to the non-elected invention as a method,
provides some guidance-but not much.9 1
In Symbol Technologies, the patents at issue related to hand-held la-
ser bar code symbol readers. 92 The patentee filed an application in
1980. The examiner required restriction to one of seven inventions.
The patentee elected "Group I" claims, directed to "aim and shoot"
light-weight laser scanning heads with an optic sighting means and a
"manually actuatable" trigger. Patent '297 issued, claiming the
elected invention.93
The patentee filed a divisional application with claims directed to
the "Group VI" invention which the examiner's restriction require-
ment referred to as a "method" of scanning, sensing, and decoding
bar code symbols. 94 The Group VI invention allowed a reader to
automatically stop scanning when the target for code was success-
fully decoded. In addition to the original automatic stopping method
claims, the patentee added apparatus claims. Both the original
method and new apparatus claims required a trigger and a step (in
the method claims) or "means" (in the apparatus claims) for "deter-
mining a successful decoding of each symbol, and for nonmanually
terminating the reading of each symbol upon the determination of
the successful decoding thereof."95
The court found no breach of the restriction requirement when
the patentee added apparatus claims in the divisional application be-
cause the method and apparatus claims are directed to the same sys-
tem.96 The patentee's expert testified that, with respect to
89. Id
90. 935 F.2d 1569, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
91. See Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1579, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d
1241, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[N]ew or amended claims in a divisional application are entitled
to the benefit of § 121 if the claims do not cross the line of demarcation drawn around the
invention elected in the restriction requirement. If that line is crossed, the issue is whether
the invention claimed in the [second] patent would have been obvious in light of the invention
claimed in the [first] patent.").
92. Id. at 1572, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1243.
93. Id.
94. Id, at 1573, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1244.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1580, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1249.
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electronics, the PTO does not distinguish between claims to an ap-
paratus and claims to a method of using it. Therefore, "the word
'method' in the description of Group VI during restriction did not
mean that the claims were limited to a method, but was merely a
short-hand description of the invented system.... [T]he examiner
collectively characterized the method and apparatus claims of an-
other non-elected group, Group IV, as a 'method.' -97
Symbol Technologies involved an easy consonance question; the new
apparatus claims simply reworded the method claims in "means-
plus-function" language. Cases in which the inventor substantially
changes the scope of the non-elected invention claims in the second
application or patent but does not introduce the limitation that is
essential to the elected invention's patentability are much tougher.
3. Terminal disclaimer as an admission of obviousness
In Quad Environmental Technologies Corp. v. Union Sanitary District,9"
the Federal Circuit held that an inventor who submits a terminal
disclaimer to overcome a PTO examiner's rejection of one patent's
claims for obviousness-type double patenting in view of the inven-
tor's prior patent is not thereby estopped from arguing that the
claims are nonobvious in view of the first patent's subject matter.99
In Quad, after the inventor submitted the disclaimer and obtained
confirmation of the claims in a reexamination, it came to light that
the subject matter of the prior patent was prior art for section 103
obviousness purposes because it had been in public use for more
than one year before the second application's filing date.'00
The court noted that a rejection for obviousness-type double pat-
enting is appropriate when "the claims of a later patent application
are deemed obvious from the claims of an earlier patent."'' ° This
occurs when the inventor or someone associated with the inventor
makes developments and improvements as they continue to work in
the field. When an applicant meets the statutory requirement of
common ownership, a convenient response is a voluntary limitation
of the term of the later-issued patent.' 0 2 A voluntary limitation
eliminates any enlargement of the term of exclusivity, but still pro-
vides limited protection to a patentee's later developments. 103
97. Id.
98. 946 F.2d 870, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
99. Quad Envtl. Technologies Corp. v. Union Sanitary Dist., 946 F.2d 870, 874-75, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d 1392, 1394-95 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
100. Id. at 873, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1393.
101. Id., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1394.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 872-74, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1393-95.
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Thus, the court concluded that a rejection for double patenting
"does not mean that the first-filed patent is a prior art reference
under § 102 against the later-filed application" because only the
claims are compared. 10 4
Therefore, filing a terminal disclaimer only removes the double
patenting rejection; it does not create a presumption or estoppel on
the merits.10 5
II. DISCLOSURE AND CLAIMING ISSUES
Section 112's first paragraph sets forth three distinct specification
disclosure requirements: the description-of-the-invention require-
ment, the enablement requirement, and the best mode require-
ment.10 6 The second paragraph sets forth the requirement of dear
claiming.10 7 These four requirements are, in theory, distinct. De-
termining the distinctions between them, however, continues to vex
courts, practitioners, and PTO examiners. An interplay exists be-
tween the requirement of clear claiming and the three disclosure
requirements. A patent's claims define the "invention" that must be
described, enabled, and "best moded." During PTO prosecution,
the original ("as filed") patent specification disclosure restrains the
ability of the applicant and the applicant's attorney to broaden, nar-
row, and re-orient claims. The temptation is great to amend claims
after the original filing to avoid newly discovered prior art and yet
encompass post-filing date evolving technology, as well as provide
broad coverage of embodiments that turn out to be commercially
important.
A. Enablement
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.,108 a highly significant Fed-
eral Circuit enablement precedent, invalidated claims in two patents
relating to human EPO, one held by Amgen, the other by Genetics
Institute. As noted above, Amgen based its patent on the EPO gene
cloning invention of its scientist. 09 The patent contained claims
104. lId at 874, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1395.
105. Id. at 873-74, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1394-95.
106. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) ("The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated
by the inventor of carrying out his invention.").
107. Id. ("The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing
out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention
108. 927 F.2d 1200, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1016 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
109. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (discussing facts of Amgen).
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specific to human EPO, including DNA isolate claims (e.g., "purified
and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a DNA se-
quence encoding human erythropoietin") and transformed host cell
claims (e.g., "procaryotic or eucaryotic host cell transformed or
transfected with" the EPO DNA sequence)." 0 The court upheld
these claims."' The patent also contained a more general claim,
number 7, "covering all possible DNA sequences that will encode
any polypeptide having an amino acid sequence 'sufficiently duplica-
tive' of EPO to possess the property of increasing production of red
blood cells.""12
The court affirmed the district court's invalidation of claim 7 as
too broad in relation to the enabling disclosure because the number
of sequences that could produce an EPO-like product is "potentially
enormous.""13 The head of the patentee's EPO analog program
testified that he did not know whether the patentee's EPO analogs
"had the biological property of causing bone marrow cells to in-
crease production of reticulocytes and red blood cells, and to in-
crease hemoglobin synthesis or iron uptake.""14  In finding
insufficient disclosure to support claim 7, the district court relied on
the unpredictability of the art-the fact that "[a]fter five years of ex-
perimentation... '[the patentee] is still unable to specify which ana-
logs have the biological properties set forth in claim 7.' "15 The
court determined that the primary question centered on whether
the scope of enablement of the claim was co-extensive with the
scope of the claim itself."16 The fact that some degree of experi-
110. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1204, 18 U.S.P.Q02d
1016, 1019 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
111. Ia at 1219, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1031.
112. Id at 1212, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1026. Claim 7 was for
[a] purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a DNA sequence
encoding a polypeptide having an amino acid sequence sufficiently duplicative of that
of erythropoietin to allow possession of the biological property of causing bone mar-
row cells to increase production of reticulocytes and red blood cells, and to increase
hemoglobin synthesis or iron uptake.
Id. at 1204, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1019. The patent specification stated that "one may readily
design and manufacture genes" differing from that for mature EPO "in terms of the identity
or location of one or more residues .... It continued:
[Tihe present invention ... comprehend[s] all DNA sequences suitable for use in
securing expression in a ... host cell of a polypeptide product having at least a part
of the primary structural conformation and one or more of the biological properties
of erythropoietin ....
Id. at 1212-13, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1026.
113. Id. at 1213, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1026.
114. Id., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1027.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1212, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1026 (citation omitted).
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mentation is required would not result in a lack of enablement un-
less the required experimentation was "unduly extensive.""17
The Federal Circuit found that, although the trial court's result
was correct, its focus should have been on the "enablement of the
DNA sequence analysis" rather than on the "biological properties of
the EPO analogs" which were the subject of claim 7.118 Addition-
ally, the court held that the patent applicant need not test every em-
bodiment of the invention, as long as enough is disclosed "to enable
one skilled in the art to carry out the invention commensurate with
the scope of his claims." 119 In the instant case, the patentee failed
to disclose information sufficient to allow another to develop
enough DNA sequences, resulting in a refusal to grant the re-
quested claims.' 20
Genetic Institute's patent claimed a homogeneous protein of a
minimally specific activity level.' 2' The court held the claim invalid
for want of enablement, overturning the district court's contrary de-
cision. 22 The evidence indicated that the patentee's disclosed puri-
fication process did not produce a protein with the claimed activity
level.' 28 The court cautioned, however, that a patentee need not
117. IA
118. Id. at 1213, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1027.
119. hd
120. Id. at 1213-14, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1026. The court found that:
[A] patent applicant is entitled to claim his invention generically, when he de-
scribes it sufficiently to meet the requirements of Section 112. Here, however, de-
spite extensive statements in the specification concerning all the analogs of the EPO
gene that can be made, there is little enabling disclosure of particular analogs and
how to make them. Details for preparing only a few EPO analog genes are dis-
closed .... This 'disclosure' might well justify a generic claim encompassing these
and similar analogs, but it represents inadequate support for [the patentee's] desire
to claim all EPO gene analogs.
Considering the structural complexity of the EPO gene, the manifold possibilities
for change in its structure, with attendant uncertainty as to what utility will be pos-
sessed by these analogs .... more is needed concerning identifying the various ana-
logs that are within the scope of the claim, methods for making them, and structural
requirements for producing compounds with EPO-like activity. It is not sufficient,
having made the gene and a handful of analogs whose activity has not been clearly
ascertained, to claim all possible genetic sequences that have EPO-like activity.
Id. (citations and quotations omitted); see In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1438,
1445-46 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (requiring higher level of disclosure for claim in area where there is
less predictability, such as one concerning poorly understood microorganisms, than in pre-
dictable areas such as those involving mechanical or electrical elements).
121. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1216, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1029.
122. Id. at 1216-17, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1030; see In re Buchner, 929 F.2d 660, 661, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d 1331, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (affirming examiner's rejection of claim where exam-
iner could reasonably conclude that application was inadequate to enable one skilled in art to
carry out invention).
123. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1217, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1030. Genetic Institute's patent disclosed
a human EPO purification method using reverse phase high performance liquid chromatogra-
phy (RP-HPLC) and claimed both the method and purified EPO of defined characteristics,
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always prove that a disclosed process operates effectively in order to
produce a claimed product. 124
B. Best Mode
The best mode requirement is troublesome. Its policy underpin-
ning is understandable: an inventor should not be able to obtain
effective patent protection covering a technology while concealing
the best known implementation method. But in its current form and
as judicially interpreted, best mode is a trap for the unwary and a
temptation to the unscrupulous.
The disclosure requirement is absolute and pinpointed at a spe-
cific date: the patent application filing. 125 A better mode developed
one day after filing is innocuous; a better mode developed one day
before filing is fatal-even though the patent application is fully pre-
pared and on its way to the PTO and the inventor and assignee act
in good faith. Best mode also spawns uncertainty. How can one
competitor fully assess the validity of another's patent, without risk-
ing litigation to obtain discovery, when the best mode patentability
requirement depends on what the inventor contemplated on a pre-
cise date years ago?
Perhaps sensitive to these concerns, the Federal Circuit's 1991
cases took a "rule of reason" approach to best mode compliance. In
including "a specific activity of at least 160,000 IU per absorbance unit at 280 nanometers."
Ie at 1215, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1029. The claims' specific activity measurement was "expressed
as a ratio of International Units (which measure the ability of EPO to cause formation of red
blood cells) per absorbance unit (the amount of light absorbed by a sample of EPO measured
by a spectrophotometer at a given wavelength, 280 nanometers), i.e., IU/AU." Id. at 1215
n.10, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1029 n.10. The district court found that "in the absence of an express
statement in the patent, the claims would be construed to refer to in vivo rather than in vitro
specific activity." lId at 1217, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1030.
The patentee did not produce evidence that its methods had been used to prepare EPO
with the claimed specific activity. Rather, the inventor obtained the 160,000 figure by calcula-
tion. He subjected EPO to RP-HPLC, obtained a value of 83,000, and determined by chroma-
tography that at least 50% of matter was something other than EPO. Id. at 1216, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1029. In a report to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the patentee
stated it used RP-HPLC to purify EPO from natural urine sources (uEPO) and achieved a
specific activity of 109,000, based on in vivo bioassays. Id. Other scientists used the inventor's
purification method and obtained about 101,000 IU/AU. Id.
The Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in relying on certain in vitro data as
support for claims containing what was found to be an in vivo limitation. Id. at 1216-17, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1030. Also, the in vitro test on uEPO showed 173,640. The accused infringer
argued that the in vivo equivalent would be only 65%, less than 160,000. Id.
The patent gave an example of purification of EPO from recombinant sources (rEPO), that
is, by isolating the gene encoding the protein, inserting it into a host cell, replicating the cell,
causing the cell to excrete the protein into a culture medium, and harvesting the protein. The
rEPO example indicated that the inventor did not obtain purified rEPO. The patent, there-
fore, did not enable purification of either rEPO or uEPO. Id. at 1217, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1030.
124. Id. at 1217, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1030.
125. Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1535, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737,
1745 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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Wahl Instruments, Inc. v. Acvious,126 the court held that an inventor
need not necessarily disclose routine manufacturing procedures and
supplies preferred for a particular commercial embodiment.' 27 In
two biotechnology patent cases, Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical
Co. 128 and Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc. ,129 the
court found no best mode violation even though the inventors did
not make a public deposit of preferred cell lines and monoclonal
antibodies.
In Amgen, the Federal Circuit held that the district court did not
commit clear error in finding that plaintiff's patent claiming trans-
formed cells did not violate the best mode requirement.' 3 0 Plaintiff
was not required to deposit its preferred cell culture because its
specification adequately demonstrated to those skilled in the art the
procedures used to prepare such a culture. A disclosure may be ad-
equate even though it does not allow skilled workers to duplicate
exactly the inventor's best mode. 13 '
In Scripps Clinic, the Federal Circuit held that the district court
erred in holding that the patentee violated the best mode require-
ment by failing to make publicly accessible its antibody 2.2.9, used
in carrying out the patent's claimed protein purification process. 32
The inventors' specification described the inventors' preferred
method of obtaining the antibodies. The accused infringer did not
charge "concealment of special manipulations, or undisclosed tech-
niques."' 33 Rather, it argued that, because screening monoclonal
antibodies is a laborious process, the inventors should have volun-
tarily made its antibody, which was the first effective one obtained
by the patentee's screening, available to the public. 134 The court
concluded, however, that antibodies produced by the procedure de-
scribed in the specification met the specifications of those used by
the inventors.13 5
126. 950 F.2d 1575, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
127. Wahl Instruments, Inc. v. Acvious, 950 F.2d 1575, 1580, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1123, 1127
(Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1533-34, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d 1300, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding enabling requirement of patent for comer
connections satisfied even though patent described different method of making invention
than was actually used by inventors).
128. 927 F.2d 1200, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1016 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
129. 927 F.2d 1565, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
130. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1209-11, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d
1016, 1023-25 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
131. Id. at 1212, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1025.
132. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1578-80, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1011-13 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
133. Id. at 1579, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1012.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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C. Invention Description
In Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar,'3 6 the Federal Circuit noted that the
purpose of the written description requirement is not only to ex-
plain how to make and use the invention. The description must also
indicate to those skilled in the art, with reasonable clarity, that, as of
the filing date sought, the applicant possessed the invention. Thus,
"[t]he invention is, for purposes of the 'written description' inquiry,
whatever is now claimed."'137
In Vas-Cath, the court held that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment after concluding that a design patent application
with drawings depicting a catheter did not provide a sufficient "de-
scription of the invention" to support a later utility patent applica-
tion's catheter claims. 13 8 Disputed fact issues existed as to whether
the drawings conveyed with reasonable clarity to those of ordinary
skill in the art that applicant had in fact invented the device recited
in the later-asserted claims, including their "range of variation"
limitations. '3 9
Inventor Mahurkar's catheter was made up of a pair of tubes, or
lumens, which allowed blood to be removed from an artery,
processed to remove impurities, and returned at a location close to
where it was removed. Prior art catheters used concentric circular
lumens. The inventor's catheter used joined semi-circular tubes
that come to a single tapered tip and had the advantage of a 42%
smaller puncture area, yielding low rates of blood injury. The cath-
eter captured "more than half of the world's sales."140
On March 8, 1982, Mahurkar filed a design application with six
drawings of figures depicting a double lumen catheter's exterior and
cross-section. 141 As is standard practice with design applications,
Mahurkar's application contained minimal textual description. The
drawings depicted a tapered catheter with a return lumen, indicated
by a down arrow, ending with an opening at the catheter's tip and a
lumen ending with an opening at the catheter's midpoint. Mahurkar
filed a Canadian Industrial Design application, which issued on Au-
gust 9, 1982.142 On October 1, 1984, Mahurkar filed a utility patent
application in the United States PTO, including the same drawings
136. 935 F.2d 1555, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
137. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1111, 1117 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original).
138. Id. at 1566-67, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1119.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1558, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1112.
141. Id. at 1557-58, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1112.
142. Id. at 1558, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1112-13.
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as the 1982 design application and claiming the benefit of the de-
sign application's filing date.1 43 The PTO issued patent '329 on the
1984 application and a second one, patent '141, on a further contin-
uation application filed in 1986. In a 1987 office action, the exam-
iner stated that the utility application was "considered to be fully
supported by applicant's parent [design] application." 1 44
The utility patents' claims contained several limitations, including
one specifying a range for the ratio between the upper two-lumen
portion and the lower single-lumen portion diameters.145 The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment, finding the patents not enti-
tled to the benefit of the design application's filing date under 35
U.S.C. § 120 and, therefore, anticipated by the inventor's 1984 Ca-
nadian design registration.146
The accused infringer conceded that the parent design applica-
tion's drawings met the section 112 enablement requirement (i.e.,
they enabled one skilled in the art to practice the claimed invention)
but contended that the drawings failed to fulfill section 112's written
description requirement. 47 The district court found a want of writ-
ten description on two grounds. First, the design application did
not suggest what feature or "subset or superset of the features
shown" constituted the invention. 48 Second, the application did
not suggest the range of variation that was allowed within the scope
of the claims.' 49
The Federal Circuit held that the district court did not impose the
correct legal standard for "written description" compliance and
erred in its conclusion that no genuine issues of material fact were
in dispute.' 50 The court stated that "[t]here is 'no legally recogniza-
ble or protected "essential" element, "gist" or "heart" of the inven-
tion in a combination patent.' . . . [Rather,] '[t]he invention' is
defined by the claims on appeal. "51 In this case, the court noted
that the claims did not recite the separate features of the invention,
but instead, described a catheter having a combination of those fea-
143. Ia at 1558-59, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1113.
144. IA at 1559, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1113.
145. Ia at 1567-69, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1120-21. An example is '329 independent claim 1,
which specifies that the "second cylindrical portion has a diameter substantially greater than
one-half but substantially less than a full diameter of said first [distal] cylindrical portion." Id
at 1568, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1120.
146. Id. at 1557, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1112.
147. Id. at 1559, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1113.
148. Id. at 1565, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1118.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 345
(1961)).
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tures. The combination was shown by the design application
drawings.152
The court, however, had greater difficulty with the question of
"range of variation." The patentee submitted an expert declaration
explaining "why one of skill in the art of catheter design and manu-
facture, studying the drawings of the '081 application in early 1982,
would have understood from them that the return lumen must have
a diameter within the range recited by independent claims 1 and 7
of the '329 patent."15 3
The district court found the expert's reasoning logical, but noted
that the inventor's later patents disclosed diameter ratios which
would not be logically calculated under this explanation, and which
were therefore not necessarily excluded by the design applica-
tion.' 54 The Federal Circuit ruled that the inventors' later patents
using different range limitations were irrelevant to the issue at hand
because the sufficiency of an application under section 112's first
paragraph is determined as of the date the application is filed.' 55
D. Claims
Section 112's second paragraph imposes a requirement of claim
definiteness. In Amgen, the court affirmed a district court's finding
that a patent claim to a purified protein of "at least about" a numeri-
152. Id.
153. Id at 1566, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1119. The expert stated that:
[A] return (longer) lumen of diameter less than half that of the two lumens combined
would produce too great a pressure increase, while a return lumen of diameter equal
or larger than that of the two lumens combined would result in too great a pressure
drop.
Higher pressure drops are associated with smaller cross-sectional areas for fluid
flow. [The patentee's] opening brief to this court states that by applying well-known
principles of fluid mechanics (i.e., the work of Poiseulle and Hagen), it can be calcu-
lated that the diameter of the circular (return) lumen would have to be in the range
of 0.66 times the diameter of the two lumens combined in order to achieve proper
blood flow at equal pressure drop. The 0.66 ratio falls within the noted claim
limitation.
Id. at 1566 & n.7, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1119 & n.7.
154. Id. at 1566, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1119.
155. Id The court stated that a drawing or other specification invention disclosure need
not necessarily include
all diameters other than those within the claimed range .... [T]he proper test is
whether the drawings conveyed with reasonable clarity to those of ordinary skill that
[the applicant] had in fact invented the catheter recited in those claims, having(among other limitations) a return lumen diameter substantially less than 1.0 but
substantially greater than 0.5 times the diameter of the combined lumens. Consider-
ation of what the drawings conveyed to persons of ordinary skill is essential.
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cally specific activity level was invalid for indefiniteness.1 56 Genetic
Institute's patent disclosed a method of purifying human EPO using
reverse phase high performance liquid chromatography (RP-
HPLC). It claimed both the method and the purified EPO of de-
fined characteristics. Several claims recited "a specific activity of at
least 160,000 IU per absorbance unit at 280 nanometers," while
claims 4 and 6 recited specific activity of "at least about 160,000."'17
The claims' specific activity was measured by a ratio of International
Units per absorbance unit, or IU/AU.' 58 During the patent's prose-
cution, the inventor amended the claims' activity level from 120,000
to "at least about 160,000" after the examiner rejected the claims
on a reference showing a 128,620 activity. 159
The district court found that because bioassays provided impre-
cise measurement (use of the term "about" 160,000 IU/AU to-
gether with the inherent range of error in the activity), the invention
was not distinguishable from the closest prior art and that it was
unclear what activity values below 160,000 might constitute in-
fringement.' 60 With regard to the definition of "about 160,000,"
the inventor testified that "somewhere between 155[,000], might fit
within that number."' 16 1 The patent owner's joint venture partner
questioned whether the specific activity value of 138,000 IU/AU for
its own rEPO was within the claim coverage. 62
The Federal Circuit noted that invalidity for indefiniteness entails
determining whether a person skilled in the relevant art would un-
derstand what is claimed.' 65 Because no evidence was presented in-
dicating the range of activity referred to by the term "about," the
meaning of the claims was sufficiently in doubt to justify invalidating
them, especially in light of the existence of close prior art. 164 The
court, however, cautioned that its holding did not rule out all use of
the term "about" in patent claims. It stated that its use "may be
acceptable in appropriate fact situations."'' 6 5
156. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1217-18, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d
1016, 1030-31 (Fed. Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
157. Id. at 1203, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1018-19.
158. Id. at 1215 n.10, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1029 n.10. International units measure EPO's
ability to cause the formation of red blood cells, while absorbance units measure the amount
of light absorbed by a sample of EPO at a wavelength of 280 nanometers. Id.
159. l at 1217-18, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1030.
160. Id. at 1217, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1030.
161. Id. at 1218, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1031.
162. Id. at 1217, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1030.
163. Id.
164. Id., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1031.
165. Id.
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III. PATENT PROSECUTION ISSUES
A. Inequitable Conduct
The "duty of disclosure" applies to an inventor and the inventor's
representatives, particularly the attorney or agent handling a patent
application. Such persons must not misrepresent material facts or
fail to disclose material information of which they are aware to the
PTO during prosecution of the inventor's patent application. 166
"Inequitable conduct" means that noncompliance with this duty of
disclosure during the prosecution of an application for a patent con-
stitutes grounds for rendering the patent unenforceable-even if
the patent is otherwise valid and infringed. 167
In past years, Federal Circuit decisions focused primarily on the
culpability component of the inequitable conduct defense, empha-
sizing that a conclusion of unenforceability due to inequitable con-
duct could be reached only if there was a finding of an "intent to
mislead."' 1 8 An intent to mislead could not be inferred solely from
evidence establishing an actor's gross negligence. 169 This high cul-
pability threshold has made inequitable conduct difficult, but not
impossible, to sustain. 170
The major 1991 decision involving the issue of inequitable con-
duct focused on the materiality standard. The court, in Halliburton
Co. v. Schlumberger Technology Corp., 17 1 emphasized that undisclosed
information that is "cumulative" to the information considered by
the PTO examiner during a patent's prosecution is not material,
even under the low threshold of materiality under Rule 56.172 In
Haiiburton, the court found that failure to disclose cumulative infor-
166. See generally 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 19.03 (1991) (examining concept of
fraudulent procurement in patent).
167. Id.; see Mechanical Plastic Corp. v. Rawlplug Co., 14 U.S.P.Q2d 1058, 1060-61
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (discussing development of concept of inequitable conduct as means of inval-
idating patent of applicant who has breached duty to disclose).
168. Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872-73, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d 1384, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (reversing holding of inequitable conduct based
on gross negligence rather than affirmative finding of intent), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067
(1989); FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 525, 5 U.S.P.Q2d 1272, 1275
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (remanding to trial court for finding of intent); FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co.,
835 F.2d 1411, 1415, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1112, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding no inequitable con-
duct without evidence that applicant intended to withhold information).
169. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876, 9 U.S.P..2d at 1394.
170. See Fox Indus., Inc. v. Structural Preservation Sys., Inc., 922 F.2d 801, 803-04, 17
U.S.P.Q.2d 1579, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding intent where applicant failed to show
good faith rationale for withholding material information).
171. 925 F.2d 1435, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1834 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
172. Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Technology Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 1440, 17
U.S.P.Q.2d 1834, 1839 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1991) (defining material
information as that which would be "important in deciding whether to allow the application to
issue as a patent")).
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mation could not form the basis of a finding of inequitable conduct
in patent procurement and held that the district court's findings of
materiality and intent to deceive the PTO were clearly erroneous.173
The patents in suit related to oil well high energy neutron log-
ging. An instrument descending a well borehole emits neutrons
that collide with surrounding earth formations, generating "capture
gamma rays" which the instrument detects. To screen out gamma
rays from the well casing, prior art instruments used a technique
called "timing out" based on an assumption that the neutron decay
causing gamma rays occurs sooner in the borehole. 174
"Timing out," however, was "fraught with uncertainty" because
of borehole condition variation.' 75 In lieu of "timing out," the ap-
plicant's inventions detected radiation over a minimum of four time
intervals and generated at least four count signals, which were com-
bined "according to a predetermined relationship to simultaneously
separate the borehole and formation decay components and to de-
rive at least two measurement signals representative of the... decay
time of the borehole . . . arid the earth formation .... ,"76 The
patent specifications teach taking four measurements to obtain data
points and using a computer program based on a two-exponential
equation with four unknowns to establish two values for borehole
feedback and two values for formation feedback. The specifications
further teach mathematical processing of the measurements to de-
termine the borehole and formation neutron characteristics. 77
The applicant did not disclose any prior art references to the PTO
during the application process.' 7 8 The examiner cited six patent
references relating to pulse-moderation systems. The district court
determined that the applicant committed inequitable conduct by
failing to disclose seven other patents of which it was aware.' 79 The
examiner cited two Smith patents that assumed the mathematical
relationship expressed in the two-exponential equation, but mea-
sured the neutron population at only two time gates. One relied on
the "timing-out technique"; it assumed that borehole decay eventu-
ally reaches zero, obtained two data points, and reduced the equa-
173. Halliburton, 925 F.2d at 1440, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1839. The PTO recently proposed
rule changes that would abandon the "important to a reasonable examiner" standard ofmate-
riality. See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 56 Fed. Reg. 37,321 (1991) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. § 1.56) (proposed Aug. 6, 1991).
174. Halliburton, 925 F.2d at 1436-48, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1836-37.
175. Ia at 1438, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1836-37.
176. ld at 1438-39, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1838 (quoting claim 1 of patent as representative of
relevant technology of applicant's patents).
177. IL at 1439, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1838.
178. Id
179. Id
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tion from one to two exponents. The other estimated the two
borehole unknowns from borehole water salinity, again reducing
the equation to one exponent and two data points.180
The Federal Circuit reaffirmed the materiality standard of Rule 56
but emphasized that information that is cumulative or "less mate-
rial" than information already before the PTO is not material.' 8 '
The court then held that the district court erred in dismissing the
Smith patents as "less material" because they were based on timing-
out. It concluded that "[i]n the art of neutron well logging, the
Smith patents were highly material to [the] applications. The most
pertinent prior art in the field was thus before the examiner."18 2
Another uncited reference, the Neufeld patent, recognized the
two-exponential equation but reached its result differently than the
applicant's inventions or the cited references.' 83 It derived neutron
decay results mathematically, discharging random neutron bursts,
detecting the entire gamma ray feedback, and comparing the detec-
tor output with the neutron burst. The patents in suit, by contrast,
directly measured neutron decay results at regular intervals.'8 4 The
district court found the Neufeld patent to be material, stressing its
similarities with the applicants' claims in that both recognized de-
cay-rate derivation as exponential relationships. 8 5 The district
court, however, did not appreciate the differences that made the
Neufeld patent "less material" than the references cited in the
application. 8 6
The Federal Circuit noted that because the two-exponential equa-
tion common to Neufeld and the claimed invention was simply a
"scientific truism acknowledged by both," a reasonable patent ex-
aminer would not consider Neufeld important to the appellant's pat-
ent.'8 7 The court, moreover, found the district court's conclusion
that applicant's "principal invention" was "measuring and simulta-
neously decomposing the entire neutron decay curve ... by a two-
exponential relationship" to be clearly erroneous. 8 Thus, in so
mischaracterizing the applicant's claims, which really involved "a
method of measuring directly the formation and borehole compo-
180. Id. at 1440, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1839.
181. Id. Stressing that Rule 56 is the proper starting point, the court excepted from dis-
closure "an otherwise material reference if the reference is cumulative or less material than
those already before the examiner." Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1440-41, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1839.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1441, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1839-40.
187. Id., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1840.
188. Id.
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nents of the decay curve between regular neutron pulses in four
time gates," the district court missed the significance of the differ-
ences between it and the Neufeld reference.' 8 9
Additional uncited references, the Texaco patents, recognized the
two-exponential equation but determined borehole and formation
neutron decay times differently, using continuous neutron emission,
varied harmonically as a function of time and modulated at three
frequencies. Because these patents disclosed a different method,
the court found them to be less material than the cited refer-
ences.1 90 Furthermore, although the patent attorney drafting the
applicant's patents used one Texaco patent "as a template" in draft-
ing the background portion of one of the applications, this did not
increase its level of materiality. 9 1 Similarly, the court found uncited
"skip-a-beat" patents that disclosed a background correction
method included by the applicants as one step of their claimed
method to be less material than the cited references. 92
The Federal Circuit also held the district court's finding of intent
to mislead to be clearly erroneous. There was no direct evidence of
the applicant's intent to mislead in the record. The court refused to
equate even gross negligence with intent unless " 'viewed in light of
all the evidence, including evidence indicative of good faith,' the
conduct is culpable enough 'to require a finding of intent to
deceive.' "193 The PTO examiner had found and relied upon "the
most pertinent prior art in the field. 94 The withheld references
solved the problem in question in an "entirely different way" than
the patents in suit. Those references, unlike the most pertinent ref-
erence, disclosed an equation relied upon in the patents in suit, but
that equation was known in the art and was "not part of the claims in
any of the patents."' 95 The Federal Court thus found the claim of
the applicant's patent attorney that he had no intent to mislead to be
objectively reasonable. 196
In finding intent to mislead, the district court relied on various
factors. For example, the applicant's assignee attempted to license
one uncited patent, and its attorney used another uncited patent "as
189. Id
190. id at 1442, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1840.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1441, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1840.
193. Id. at 1442-43, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1841 (quoting Kingsdown Medical Consultants,
Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1384, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
194. Id. at 1440, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1839.
195. Id. at 1443, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1841.
196. Id.
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a template in drafting" one of the applications. 97 While these fac-
tors might indicate carelessness or gross negligence on the part of
the applicant, they may merely illustrate that the applicant under-
stood the narrow technical basis for its claimed inventions.198 The
court found both scenarios insufficient to show inequitable conduct,
concluding that "[a]n applicant's conduct in its entirety must 'mani-
fest a sufficiently culpable state of mind to warrant a determination
that it was inequitable.' "199
Finally, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the "balancing" approach
to inequitable conduct which requires that the trial court perform a
two-step analysis. 200 First, the trial court must determine whether
the withheld references meet a threshold level of materiality and
whether the applicant's conduct meets a threshold showing of intent
to mislead.20' Second, assuming that the first inquiry is satisfied,
the trial court must balance materiality and intent. At this level,
"[t]he more material the omission, the less culpable the intent re-
quired, and vice versa. '"202
In Scripps Clinic, the Federal Circuit held that the district court er-
roneously granted summary judgment, finding a reissue patent un-
enforceable because of statements to the PTO concerning
enablement.203 The district court considered the materiality of un-
disclosed prior information but failed to mention intent.20 4 The
Federal Circuit stressed that intent is essential to a finding of inequi-
table conduct, and that intent must be proven by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. 205 The court also noted that a reference, which is only
material to withdrawn claims, cannot form the basis of an inequita-
ble conduct finding.206 It is irrelevant how a reference reaches the
examiner's attention; the reference is not considered to be withheld
197. Id at 1442-43, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1840-41.
198. Id. at 1443, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1841.
199. Id, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1841-42 (quoting Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Fosco Int'l
Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 809, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481, 1484 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
200. Id at 1439, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1838.
201. Id. (citing J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560, 223 U.S.P.Q0
1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
202. Id at 1439, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1832; see Under Sea Indus., Inc. v. Dacor Corp., 833
F.2d 1551, 1559, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1772, 1777 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (balancing intent with materiality
such that "if one is particularly strong, a lesser degree of the other" is sufficient to find inequi-
table conduct).
203. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1571-74, 18
U.S.P.Q2d 1001, 1006-08 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
204. Id. at 1573, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1008.
205. Id. at 1573-74, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1008.
206. Id. at 1583, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1014-15 (citing Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Manitowac
Co., 835 F.2d 1437, 1457, 223 U.S.P.Q. 603, 616-17 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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if it is disclosed by the applicant or discovered by the examiner's
search. 20 7
B. Reissue
Federal Circuit decisions oscillate on what constitutes sufficient
"error" to support a reissue application to change a patent's
claims. 20 8 In Scripps Clinic, the court adopted a liberal approach.
Scripps used reissue to add pure product claims to its original Fac-
tor VIII:C patent's process and product-by-process claims. 209 In
their reissue declaration, the inventors stated they had always
viewed the Factor VIII:C product as their invention, pointing to the
specification's statement that the invention's objective was to pro-
duce highly purified Factor VIII:C.210 The accused infringer did not
contest that an error occurred or assert that the inventors' attor-
ney's initial view that product claims were unavailable involved de-
ceptive intention. The district court interpreted the reissue statute,
35 U.S.C. § 251, to require a showing that the error could not have
been avoided.2 11 The Federal Circuit, however, disagreed, holding
that the statute does not dictate such a stringent showing. 21 2 The
court noted that one of the most prevalent defects supporting a reis-
sue application is an attorney's failure to claim the invention suffi-
ciently broadly.2 18
The standard for determining whether the statutorily required er-
ror has been met is objective, and does not require evidence of sub-
jective state of mind.2 14 Thus, proof that the applicants intended to
claim less than they had a right to claim is not necessary. 2 15
207. Id at 1582, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1015.
208. Compare In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1519, 222 U.S.P.Q. 369, 372 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(holding patent attorney's declaration that he did not understand invention's scope satisfies
statutory error requirement), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1209 (1985) with In re Weiler, 790 F.2d
1576, 1580 n.4, 229 U.S.P.Q. 673, 677 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (rejecting allegations that inven-
tor's ignorance of patent claim drafting techniques and of patent counsel's ignorance of in-
vention was sufficient to constitute error).
209. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1568, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1003, petition for reh 'g denied and petitionfor reh'g in banc under consideration, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d 1896 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
210. Id. at 1575, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1008-09.
211. Id, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1009.
212. Id. ("The law does not require that no competent attorney or alert inventor could
have avoided the error sought to be corrected by reissue.").
213. Id. (citing In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1519, 222 U.S.P.Q. 369,371 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
214. Id.; see also In re Amos, 953 F.2d 613, 618, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1271, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(affirming lower court's use of objective test for determining whether new claims submitted
during reissue are for invention originally disclosed).
215. Scripps Clinic, 927 F.2d at 1575, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1009 (citing In re Weiler, 790 F.2d
1576, 1581, 229 U.S.P.Q. 673, 676 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
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In Green v. Rich Iron Co. ,216 the court held that a district court may
not compel a patentee to seek reissue to resolve patent validity and
enforceability questions. Green, the patentee, sued Rich Iron and
two individuals, claiming they infringed his patent.21 7 The defend-
ants asserted that the patent was (a) invalid because of a public use
or on sale bar, and (b) unenforceable because of inequitable con-
duct in the procurement process. The district court stayed the suit
and ordered the patentee to seek PTO reissue, citing "the special
expertise of the U.S. Patent Office regarding the validity of patents
and concerns of judicial economy .. ',218 The district court then
confirmed the order after the patentee directed its attention to a
PTO Commissioner notice stating that it would neither investigate
nor reject reissue applications based on inequitable conduct.2 19 In
reversing, the Federal Circuit noted that ordering a patentee, who
insists there is no error in the patent, to seek reissue compels the
patentee to attest to error the patentee believes is nonexistent. 220
C. Reexamination
The court has yet to resolve a number of problems that arise
when a patent is simultaneously involved in district court litigation
involving its validity and a PTO reexamination. Because of different
proof burdens and claim interpretation standards, the two tribunals
may well reach different conclusions-the court upholding the pat-
ent claim's validity and the PTO canceling it for unpatentability. In
Standard Havens Products, Inc. v. Gencor Industries, Inc.,221 the district
court held a patent not invalid after full trial, and the infringer ap-
pealed to the Federal Circuit.222 Meanwhile, in a reexamination, the
examiner rejected the patent's claims and, while the Federal Circuit
appeal was pending, the Board of Appeals affirmed the rejection. 223
The Federal Circuit raised the question whether it should stay the
appeal pending judicial review of the PTO action, which could lead
to cancellation of the patent claims, but decided not to do so in part
because neither party wanted a stay.224
216. 944 F.2d 852, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
217. Green v. Rich Iron Co., 944 F.2d 852, 853, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1075, 1076 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
218. Id.
219. Id. (explaining that notwithstanding notice, PTO remained best forum for resolving
technical considerations inherent in public use and sale).
220. Id.
221. 953 F.2d 1360, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
222. Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1363, 21
U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
223. Id. at 1366, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1325-26.
224. Id. at 1366 n.2, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1326 n.2.
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If the patentee makes a "substantive" change in a patent claim
during reexamination or reissue, it cannot assert the claim against
pre-reexamination or reissue conduct. Patentees therefore fre-
quently argue that a change was merely a "clarification." In Laitram
Corp. v. NEC, Corp. ,225 the court held, in response to a certified ques-
tion, that claims are not per se substantially changed when they are
amended during reexamination following a rejection based on prior
art.226 The court stated that "[tlo determine whether a claim
change is substantive it is necessary to analyze the claims of the orig-.
inal and the reexamined patents in light of the particular facts, in-
cluding the prior art, the prosecution history, other claims, and any
other pertinent information." 227
IV. INFRINGEMENT ISSUES
Infringement is the unauthorized invasion of a patent owner's
statutory exclusive rights in the invention, as defined by the patent's
claims.228 Determining infringement involves interpreting the claim
language, assessing the nature of the accused infringer's acts, and
applying the interpreted claims to those acts. Only acts, such as un-
authorized manufacture or sale, constitute infringement. It is, how-
ever, commonplace to say that a device "infringes" when discussing
the relationship of an accused device to a patent claim.
A. Exclusive Rights
In Intel Corp. v. International Trade Commission,229 the court held that
if a patent claim only requires an ability to perform a function, sell-
ing a device with that ability infringes even though the seller never
told customers how to use the function.23 0 The patent claimed an
EPROM memory chip with page mode addressing capability.2 3 1
The court concluded that capability to operate in page mode was
sufficient to constitute infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.2 32 The accused infringer argued that it did not infringe
because, although its chips were capable of performing page mode
225. 952 F.2d 1357, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
226. Laitram Corp. v. NEC, Corp., 952 F.2d 1357, 1362, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1276, 1280 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
227. Id.
228. 35 U.S.C. §§154, 271 (1991).
229. 946 F.2d 821, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
230. Intel Corp. v. International Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 832, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161,
1171 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
231. Id. The claim referred to "programmable selection means" and specifically stated
"when said alternate addressing mode is selected," meaning that the accused device need only
be capable of operating in page mode to constitute infringement. Id. (emphasis in original).
232. Id.
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addressing, customers were never told how to convert the chip to
page mode operation or that conversion was possible.233 Moreover,
the infringer cited Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill23 4 to argue that intent to
use the parts in an infringing manner is required.235 The court,
however, disagreed, stating that direct infringement has no intent el-
ement.236 Because Fromberg dealt with induced and contributory in-
fringement, the court deemed it inapplicable.23 7
B. Claim Interpretation
1. Generally
Interpreting patent claim language is critical to any decision
about patent or patent application patentability and coverage. As
with all documents that humans draft, patent claims vary in clarity.
Rules on deriving patent claim meaning can never remove the ne-
cessity for judgment and interpretation or the prospect for dispute.
The Federal Circuit issues a steady stream of claim interpretation
decisions, and the year 1991 provided its fair share.2 38
In Intel, the disclosed invention, a radiation shield, allowed a nor-
mally erasable EPROM cell to be converted to a UPROM (uner-
asable programmable read-only memory) cell.2 39 The claims
included the phrase "whereby said EPROM cell can be permanently
programmed so that said redundant elements are always used in place
of said defective elements." 240 The specification stated that the in-
vention's goal was a UPROM cell that could withstand 300 hours of
ultraviolet light exposure without erasing. Following the estab-
233. Id.
234. 315 F.2d 407, 137 U.S.P.Q. 84 (5th Cir. 1963).
235. Id (citing Fromberg Inc. v. Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407, 415, 137 U.S.P.OQ 84, 89 (51h
Cir. 1963) (stating that intent and purpose of infringer is critical for finding of contributory
infringement)).
236. Id
237. Id
238. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. International Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 836, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (rejecting defendant's argument that limitation
should be read into claims of life span of UPROM cells and accepting Commission's claim
interpretation); Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produk-Und Marketing Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945
F.2d 1546, 1552, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (concluding that accused device
did not infringe patent claims for rodless piston cylinder because normal operation of device
did not meet lateral support claim limitation); Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d
1558, 1564-65, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1500, 1505 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (explaining that claim for fabric
sheet mounting framework cannot include linear pieces with mitered ends because merger of
two concepts would be redundant and violate "all elements" rule); Scripps Clinic & Research
Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1013 (noting that when
construing claims, words of claim are looked at "independent of the accused product, in light
of the specification, the prosecution history, and the prior art"), petition for reh g denied and
petition for reh'g in banc under consideration, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1896 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
239. Intel, 946 F.2d at 832, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1171.
240. Id. (emphasis in original).
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lished rule that claims should be interpreted in light of the specifica-
tion, the accused infringer argued that "permanently programmed"
should require that an infringing cell tolerate 300 hours of expo-
sure. The court, however, disagreed because the specification did
not require such a limitation. 24 1 Consequently, the court would not
read such a limitation into the claims. 242
2. Product-by-process claims
In Scripps Clinic, the court held that product-by-process claims are
to be construed in the same manner for validity and infringe-
ment.243 Accordingly, product-by-process claims are "not limited to
products prepared by the process set forth in the claims." 244
Scripps' patent described a method for purifying and concentrat-
ing Factor VIII:C, the blood clotting factor, from natural sources by
using a monoclonal antibody. It contained process claims, such as
claim 1, which provided "[a]n improved method of preparing Factor
VIII pro-coagulant activity protein comprising the steps of.. ." and
"product-by-process" claims, such as claim 13, which provided
"[h]ighly purified and concentrated human or porcine VIII:C pre-
pared in accordance with the method of claim 1."245 Genentech,
the accused infringer, produced Factor VIII:C by a process different
from that in the Scripps specification. It used recombinant DNA
technology, i.e., isolating the gene encoding the protein, inserting it
into a host cell, replicating the cell, causing the cell to excrete the
protein into a culture medium, and purifying the protein from the
medium using Factor VIII:C monoclonal antibodies. 246
The district court found that, unless the same process was used,
product-by-process claims are not infringed.2 47 In reversing the
summary judgment of invalidity, the Federal Circuit commented
that the district court's statement that the process must be identical
for infringement to exist was inconsistent with precedent.248 There-
241. Id.
242. Id ("The 'permanently programmed' limitation only requires that the shielded
UPROM cells remain programmed for the normal life of the EPROM.").
243. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583, 18
U.S.P.Q2d 1001, 1016, petition for reh 'g denied and petition for reh'g in banc under consideration, 18
U.S.P.O.2d 1896 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
244. Id
245. Id. at 1570, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1005.
246. Id. at 1580 n.9, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1013 n.9.
247. Id. at 1583, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1016.
248. It (citing In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 697, 227 U.S.P.Q. 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(holding that prior art pertinent only to product is proper ground for rejecting product-by-
process claims); In re Brown, 459 F.2d 531, 535, 173 U.S.P.Q 685, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (ex-
plaining that, in productby-process claims, patentability of product must be established in-
dependent of process); In re Bridgeford, 357 F.2d 679, 682 n.5, 149 U.S.P.Q. 55, 58 n.5
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fore, "the correct reading of product-by-process claims is that they
are not limited to products prepared by the process set forth in the
claims." 249
3. Means-plus-function limitations
Section 112's final paragraph authorizes "means-plus-function"
limitations and provides a statutory claim construction rule. It pro-
vides that:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
means or step for performing a specified function without the re-
cital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such
claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,
material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
thereof250
This provision was Congress' response to the Supreme Court's
1946 decision in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker.251 The
facts in Halliburton resemble many current controversies over
means-plus-function clauses. Halliburton involved Walker's inven-
tion of a method to measure oil well depth by sonic probing which
improved on prior art techniques of Lehr and Wyatt by using a con-
ventional device, a mechanical acoustical resonator, to distinguish
tube collar and catcher echoes from other noises. 252 The claim de-
scribed the apparatus' echo distinguishing aspect as "means... for
tuning said receiving means to the frequency of echoes from the
tubing collars ... to dearly distinguish the echoes from said cou-
plings from each other. ' 253 The accused infringer used an electric
filter rather than a mechanical resonator.254 The Supreme Court in-
validated the claim as "too broad" and "functional. ' 255
(C.C.P.A. 1966) (recognizing that some courts in infringement litigation have construed prod-
uct-by-process claims as limited to particular process, but holding that patentability is deter-
mined independent of process)).
249. Id
250. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
251. 329 U.S. 1, 71 U.S.P.Q. 175 (1946); see CharlesJ. Zinn, Commentary on New Title 35,
U.S. Code, "Patents", 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2507, 2514 (stating that new final paragraph of sec-
tion 112 "offsets the theory of the Halliburton case").
252. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 5-6, 71 U.S.P.Q. 175, 177
(1946).
253. Id. at 9, 71 U.S.P.Q. at 178.
254. Id. at 12, 71 U.S.P.Q. at 180.
255. Id. ("What [Walker] claimed ... is that his patent bars anyone from using in an oil
well any device heretofore or hereafter invented which combined with the Lehr and Wyatt
machine performs the function of ... catching and recording echoes from tubing joints with
regularity. Just how many different devices there are of various kinds and characters which
would serve to emphasize these echoes, we do not know. The Halliburton device, alleged to
infringe, employs an electric filter for this purpose. In this age of technological development
there may be many other devices beyond our present information or indeed our imagination
which will perform that function and yet fit hese claims. And unless frightened from the
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Halliburton was poorly reasoned.256 The patentee, however, may
have invited the error by suggesting that its claim covered every
means of achieving the designated function, not simply those means
that were equivalent to his disclosed means.257 The dispositive is-
sue should have been whether the defendant's electric filter was the
technological equivalent of the patentee's disclosed means, a
mechanical resonator. A negative answer should have led to a con-
clusion of noninfringement, not invalidity. In enacting the 1952
Act, Congress included section 112's last paragraph to restore the
law to its pre-Halliburton state.258
Three significant 1991 Federal Circuit cases addressed means-
plus-function limitation interpretation. In Symbol Technologies, Inc. v.
Opticon, Inc.,259 the court held that the patentee presented a prima
facie infringement showing by offering expert opinion testimony
that the accused device met each claim limitation, even though the
limitations were in a means-plus-function format and the expert did
not discuss the structural equivalency between the allegedly infring-
ing devices and the patent specifications in detail. 260 The court
noted that a patentee bears the burden of showing section 112(6)
means and structure equivalency, but Rule 705 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence allows a patentee to meet that burden by presenting
expert opinion testimony without disclosing the factual founda-
tion.261 The court conceded, however, that it is not easy to apply a
claim drafted under section 112(6) to an accused device because
course of experimentation by broad functional claims like these, inventive genius may evolve
many more devices to accomplish the same purpose.").
256. See 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENrs § 8.04[1], at 8-62 (1991) (arguing that Halliburton
created unreasonably high standard of definiteness for patent claims). Prior to Halliburton,
means-plus-function was a common style of claim language and had received the apparent
approval of the Supreme Court in Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210
U.S. 405 (1908). Id. Halliburton ran against the prevailing notions that a patentee need not
describe every possible variation of the invention in its specification and that a patent would
include later specific improvements if they "stood on the shoulders" of the first patent. Id
257. See Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 12, 71 U.S.P.Q. at 180 (explaining that Walker's claim
bars anyone from using any device which combined with Lehr/Wyatt machine records and
catches echoes from tubing joints).
258. See In re Fuetterer, 319 F.2d 259, 264 n.ll, 138 U.S.P.Q. 217, 221 n.Il (C.C.P.A.
1963) (quoting statement of Rep. Joseph R. Bryson (S.C.) that "this provision in reality will
give statutory sanction to combination claiming as it was understood before the Halliburton
decision. All the elements of a combination now will be able to be claimed in terms of what they do as well
as in terms of what they are." (emphasis in original)).
259. 935 F.2d 1569, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
260. Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1575, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d
1241, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
261. Id. at 1576, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1246.
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paragraph six allows "an element in a claim to be expressed as a
means or step for performing a specified function." 262
In Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc.,263 the court held the interpreta-
tion of section 112(6), that "means" be limited to equivalents of
specification-disclosed corresponding structure, applicable to
means-plus-function clauses that recite some structure.26 4 More-
over, the court stated that the statute overrides claim
differentiation. 265
The patent at issue in Laitram claimed a conveyer belt consisting
of plastic modules pivotally connected at their link ends which "al-
lows smooth transfer of containers to and from the head and tail
ends of a conveyor via a transfer comb." 266 The claim required, in-
ter alia:
Subparagraph 1: "a plurality of like modules", each including
"first and second like pluralities of link ends of substantially identi-
cal width", each end circumscribing "a pivotal hole through said
width"; and
Subparagraph 2: "means for joining said pluralities to one another
so that the axes of said holes of said first plurality are arranged
coaxially, the axes of said holes of said second plurality are ar-
ranged coaxially and the axes of respective holes of both plurali-
ties of link ends are substantially parallel. '267
The patent's specification described the link end joining means as
requiring at least one, and preferably a pair, of spaced cross-mem-
bers and the illustrated structure formed an "H-shaped" grid.268
The accused structure had a "V-shape" or squared zig-zag configur-
ation and no cross member joining the link ends. It lacked a means
equivalent to that in the patent specification for performing the des-
ignated function.269
The Federal Circuit found the district court's holding of infringe-
ment was based on erroneous claim interpretation.2 70 It held that
the lower court erred as a matter of law by not interpreting subpara-
graph 2 of the claim 21 in accordance with section 112, paragraph
262. Id at 1575, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1245 ("[Tlhe statutory provision prevents an overly
broad claim construction by requiring reference to the specification, and at the same time
precludes an overly narrow construction that would restrict coverage solely to those means
expressly disclosed in the specification.").
263. 939 F.2d 1533, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
264. Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1538, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1367, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1534-35, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1368-69.
267. Id. (emphasis added).
268. Id. at 1536, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1370.
269. Il at 1539, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1372.
270. Id. at 1534, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1368.
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six, and by holding that "this limitation was met merely because
there was some means in the accused device that performed the
stated function." 271 The court stated that:
The recitation of some structure in a means-plus-function element
does not preclude the applicability of section 112, paragraph six.
For example, in this case, the structural description in the joining
means clause merely serves to further specify the function of that
means. The recited structure tells only what the means-for-join-
ing does, not what it is structurally. 272
The patentee in Laitram argued that claim "differentiation" pre-
vented limiting the claimed "means" to cross members because
claim 24, which was dependent upon the claim in suit, specifically
required a cross member.273 Claim differentiation directs that
"[w]here some claims are broad and others narrow, the narrow
claim limitations cannot be read into the broad whether to avoid
invalidity or to escape infiingement. ' '274 The court rejected this ar-
gument because it would allow an easy avoidance of section 112,
paragraph six. 275
In Intel Corp. v. International Trade Commission, the court stressed
that section 112, paragraph six, means equivalency and, unlike the
doctrine of equivalents, does not require consideration of prior
art.276 Section 112, paragraph six, only requires that the means em-
ployed by the accused and the allegedly infringed device be
equivalent, not identical. 277 Equivalence is determined in the same
way that any other type of claim language is interpreted-by consid-
ering "the specification, the prosecution history, other claims in the
patent, and expert testimony." 278
271. id at 1536, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1370.
272. Id, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1369.
273. Id. at 1538, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1371.
274. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1054-55, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1434,
1441 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
275. Laitram, 939 F.2d at 1538, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1371 ("[T]he judicially developed guide
to claim interpretation known as 'claim differentiation' cannot override the statute. A means-
plus-function limitation is not made open-ended by the presence of another claim specifically
claiming the disclosed structure which underlies the means clause or an equivalent of that
structure.... The patentee's argument, if adopted, would provide a convenient way of avoid-
ing the express mandate of section 112(6).... [O]ne cannot escape that mandate by merely
adding a claim or claims specifically reciting such structure or structures.").
276. Intel Corp. v. International Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 842, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161,
1179 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
277. Id ("It is only necessary to determine what is an equivalent to the structure disclosed
in the specification which is performing the function at issue.").
278. Id. at 842-43, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1179-80.
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C. Claim Application-Literal and Equivalent Infringement
The final step in infringement analysis is to apply the interpreted
patent claim to the accused device or process. If the claim literally
covers the accused product or process, there is literal infringement.
If the claim does not literally cover the accused product or process
but the accused product or process is substantially the same as that
claimed, there might be infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. 279
The doctrine of equivalents accommodates the basic, opposing
concerns for clear notice to potential infringers and fairness to in-
ventors. 280 In 1991, the Federal Circuit affirmed infringement judg-
ments based on equivalency, 28 1 but emphasized that patentees bear
a strict burden of proof.28 2 As the wag says, "it's not enough that
it's the same-or really the same; to be equivalent, it must be really,
really the same!"
The traditional tripartite equivalency test is whether a device or
process falling outside a claim's literal scope "performs substantially
the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same
result."283 This test, however, rarely provides a clear guide to de-
termining infringement by equivalency because it does not control
the level of generality that may be used in characterizing the inven-
tion's "way," "function," and "result." Patentees in litigation,
therefore, broadly characterize "way," "function," and "result" to
show similarity between the patented invention and the accused
product; accused infringers narrowly characterize "way" to show
279. See Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1535, 19 U.S.P.Q2d 1367, 1369
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that infringement may occur either when every limitation in patent
claim is found in accused device or when there is substantial equivalence).
280. See London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1456,
1458 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("On the one hand, claims must be 'particular' and 'distinct,' . . . so that
the public has fair notice of what the patentee and the Patent and Trademark Office have
agreed constitute the metes and bounds of the claimed invention. Notice permits other par-
ties to avoid actions which infringe the patent and to design around the patent.... On the
other hand, the patentee should not be deprived of the benefits of his patent by competitors
who appropriate the essence of an invention while barely avoiding the literal language of the
claims.").
281. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. International Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 20 U.S.P.Q2d
1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d 1540, 19 U.S.P.Q2d
1432 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
282. See Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1327, 21 U.S.P.O 1161,
1166 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (concluding that testimony about function, way and result achieved by
accused device is insufficient to determine equivalency because testimony was conclusory and
thus "the jury was left to its own imagination on the technical issue of equivalency"); Slimfold
Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1842, 1846 (Fed. Cir.
199 1) (holding that district court committed clear error in finding that accused device accom-
plished its result in same "way" as patented invention because changes were not "so insub-
stantial as to result in 'a fraud on the patent' ").
283. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
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differences. The Federal Circuit, however, continues to emphasize
the importance of the traditional test. In Malta v. Schulmerich Caril-
lons, Inc.,284 a sharply divided three-judge panel followed Lear Siegler,
Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co. 285 in holding that a patentee must offer spe-
cific testimony and argument, not general opinions and conclusions,
in support of the function, way, and result prongs. 28 6
Patentees asserting equivalency face two limitations: the prior art
and prosecution history estoppel. In Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v.
David Geoffrey & Associates,28 7 Judge Rich adopted new approach to
prior art constraint. The court suggested that the limitation on the
scope of equivalents should be conceptualized by imagining a pat-
ent claim of sufficient scope to literally cover the accused product
and then by asking whether the claim could have been allowed by
the PTO over the prior art.288 Several 1991 decisions purported to
apply the Wilson Sporting Goods hypothetical claim approach. 2 9 In
one decision, however, the court slipped into a comparison of the
accused infringer's product or process with the prior art.290
Prosecution history estoppel precludes expansion of the scope of
a claim to resurrect subject matter surrendered during PTO pro-
ceedings to obtain a patent.291 This issue commonly arises when
the inventor files broad claims that would literally cover a product
or process later accused of infringement, narrows the claims in re-
sponse to a rejection by a PTO examiner on the grounds of prior
art, and later asserts infringement through equivalency, arguing that
the accused product or process is more similar to the patented in-
284. 952 F.2d 1320, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
285. 873 F.2d 1422, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1767 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
286. Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1327, 21 U.S.P.Q. 1161, 1166
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
287. 904 F.2d 677, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1942 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, I11 S. Ct. 537 (1990).
288. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d 1942, 1948 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 537 (1990).
289. SeeJurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1561, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1031, 1038 (Fed. Cir.)
(applying hypothetical claim approach to windsock decoy patent infringement), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 281 (1991); Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1449, 17
U.S.P.Q.2d 1806, 1810 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (explaining hypothetical claim rationale as acknowl-
edging that prior art limits coverage available under doctrine of equivalents); Insta-Foam
Prods., Inc. v. Universal Foam Sys., Inc., 906 F.2d 698, 704, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1295, 1299 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (explaining that hypothetical claim drawn to encompass object would not have
been unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103); cf We Care, Inc. v. Ultra Mark, Int'l Corp., 930
F.2d 1567, 1571, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1562, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (vacating preliminary injunction
and remanding for determination of whether range of equivalents sought by patentee en-
croaches on prior art).
290. See Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1449, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d
1806, 1810 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (comparing defendant's decorative caps for wheel nuts with prior
art and finding no infringement under doctrine of equivalents).
291. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362, 219 U.S.P.Q. 473, 481
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
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vention than to the prior art distinguished by the amendment. The
Federal Circuit vacillates between a hardline approach, refusing to
"speculate" whether an amendment in response to a prior art rejec-
tion is necessary to distinguish the prior art, and a flexible approach,
emphasizing the amendment's nature and purpose and the prior
art.292
292. Compare Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.p.A., 944 F.2d 870,
20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1045 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (explaining that courts must consider what was changed
and reason for change, but when record does not indicate that limitation was added to avoid
prior art, prosecution history estoppel does not apply) with Dixie USA, Inc. v. Infab Corp.,
927 F.2d 584, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1969 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (affirming summary judgment in favor of
alleged infringer on grounds that lower court properly considered nature of prior art and
amendment in applying doctrine of prosecution history estoppel).
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